This essay intends to present a framework for a dialogue between Judaism and Christianity on the subject of totalitarianism. Today both Jews and Christians are burdened by the memory of two totalitarianisms: Nazi totalitarianism and Communist totalitarianism, particularly its Stalinist variant. Although the experiences that were suffered arouse dread, they also force our consciences to be vigilant. They demand that every effort be made both to avoid a repetition of the tragedy and to extract some prospect of hope from the agonizing memories. Particular attention will be paid to the possibility of dialogue on a philosophical level since it is an undeniable task of intellectuals addressing the issue of totalitarianism to deprive it of its ideological legitimacy. A critique of totalitarian ideologies should be adequate to the nature of the particular ideologies in question. It is characteristic of these ideologies that they claim to be rational; and since totalitarianism cites science, rational philosophy and theory based on experience, philosophy is the only discipline which has the necessary means of countering these claims. Although criticism from a strictly religious or even theological standpoint cannot in principle be ruled out, it is in the nature of such criticism that it can only be conducted on a level that is accessible exclusively to the faithful; this automatically precludes any direct confrontation. This does not, however, mean that a philosophical critique of totalitarianism is incompatible with religion. The religious inspiration of philosophy must nonetheless be distinguished from the rational criteria which philosophy applies.

Although it would no doubt be interesting to consider possible ways in which the religious inspiration and rational thought in philosophy could be reconciled, this would constitute a wide digression from our subject. What we propose to do here is to set forth a critique of totalitarianism through the dialogue between Christian philosophy – particularly its Augustinian variant – and the so-called philosophy of dialogue which has – at least through two of its advocates: Franz Rosenzweig and Emanuel Levinas – engaged in a radical critique of modern totalitarianism from the Jewish standpoint.

It is not just totalitarianism, however, that is the crucial issue at stake in the dialogue on totalitarianism. There comes a point at which we must raise the issue of the genuine meaning of our faiths – I say 'our' because they have evolved from a common origin – and of the attitude to the world of unbelief that has arisen from it. This attitude has polarized until now into two partly divergent standpoints: on the one hand were those, in the main Christians, who in their apostolic zeal attempted to bring about a 'synthesis' between the truths of the revelation and the wisdom of pagan knowledge, and on the other hand were those, in the main Jews, who out of concern for the treasures that had been delivered to them and them alone disassociated themselves from everything that was pagan, and lived on this earth as if they were lonely islanders. There was a certain danger inherent in both standpoints. Attempts at synthesis resulted in problematical compromise, and preoccupation with maintaining a distinctive identity led to isolation. The tragedy of totalitarianism and its unimaginable atrocities has convulsed both Jews and Christians and has led to the question whether compromise with the pagan world does not open the floodgates to totalitarianism, and whether preoccupation with personal spiritual excellence is not tantamount to the sin of passivity. In other words, we must ask whether we ourselves were not, through insufficient loyalty to our own heritage, directly or indirectly responsible for summoning up the evil spirits which spread throughout Europe. The possibility of such a conjecture raises the crucial issue of the significance of the faith of Abraham as a value both for us and for the world. In this way the dialogue on totalitarianism is gradually transformed into a dialogue on the essential nature of the common aspects of our faith.

I propose to discuss three issues. First, a clarification of the concept of totalitarianism is needed to provide a foundation for further analysis. Second, an evaluation of totalitarianism from the perspective of the basic tenets of the Judaeo-Christian tradition is also necessary. Only when we have done this will it be possible to enter upon a critique of totalitarianism. Finally, I will ask which experiences, concepts and beliefs common to both Judaism and Christianity can lay the basis for denying the claims of totalitarianism. It is only when these questions have been answered that it may be possible to illuminate the area of our common responsibility.

Totalitarianism eludes simple definition since it is not clear whether it is to be viewed from the standpoint of those who exercise totalitarian power or from the standpoint of its subjects and especially its victims. It is an essential feature of totalitarianism that it does not allow any viewpoint other than its own; the consciousness of power and power itself permeate all things and tend to fill the framework in which power itself is to be thought about.

An analysis of the concept can serve as a starting-point. The word 'totalitarianism' is derived from the Latin 'totus' meaning 'whole' and it is worth examining the intentional meaning of this word when the suffix '-ism' is appended to it. The concept of totalitarianism denotes a system of exercising power in which that power, aiming to subjugate the whole person, claims to be the expression of a force which rules over the whole of reality and therefore has the right to use all and any means of coercion against its opponents. Totalitarianism is more than just tyranny or absolutism; the difference between them does not, however, lie in the extent of its lawlessness but in the way it seeks to legitimate its power. Power in a totalitarian regime presents itself as the expression of an absolute force which rules over everything in the territory in which it prevails, and which simultaneously claims that it and it alone possesses the knowledge necessary for the attainment of this objective. The omnipotence of power is the foundation of its claim to infallibility. Its belief in its infallibility reinforces its omnipotence.

There is a further aspect to the concept of totality. One of the consequences of totalitarian ideology is the thesis that all relations between one person and another can be reduced to the relationship of the part to the whole. This implies that all relations between human beings, including the most intimate, are subordinated to the interests of the 'whole' and in particular to the interests of the state. As a result, every close relationship becomes a  relationship, which must be controlled by the state; even friendship must have the approval of the state. The power of totalitarianism owes its success to the industrial age, and for this reason the concept of the whole and the part should be extended to include the image of a machine and its components, or even better the image of electricity and the billions of light bulbs and engines which it illuminates or sets in motion. It was Lenin, after all, who said that Communism equals Soviet power plus human beings and the relationships between them as instruments for its own end. Totalitarianism is a radical negation of the Kantian categorical imperative, which asserts that the human being should always be an end in him or herself and not a means to the end of another person. The instrumentalization of the relationships of human beings would, nevertheless, appear to be more a consequence of totalitarianism than its principal tenet; this derives from the entire ontology and epistemology which totalitarianism adduces to legitimate its claims.

Stalinism can serve as an example. Stalin defined the essence of historical materialism as follows: 'Historical materialism is the extension and application of the principles of dialectical materialism to the study of the phenomena of social life and of its history’[1].

[1] J. Stalin, Problems of Leninism, Moscow, 1954, p. 713.