A comparison of Liberation Theology and the Ethics of Solidarity presents itself as a matter of course. In both we come across a massive social movement fighting against political and economic totalitarianism, in both there is a link between the issue of freedom and the issue of religion, in both there is a comprehensive co-operation between intellectuals and the oppressed, the exploited. Also the moral source of both movements seems to be alike: the source is a sensitivity of conscience to social harm done to man. The similarities of both are revealed in the very names by which they like to be referred to: liberation and solidarity. There occurs a reciprocal connection between liberation and solidarity: liberation without solidarity is as impossible as solidarity without liberation.

But there are differences as well. On the one hand, we have the image of a social movement of an international character which defines itself by means of theological terminology; this movement aims at reforming not only the state and its economy but also the Church, which arouses understandable opposition on the part of other theologians and the hierarchy. On the other hand, we see a movement of a prominently Polish character, which, regardless of its success, is still so immersed in its emergency affairs that it cannot find time for a deeper theoretical reflection; a movement which, though connected to religion, has no intention to define itself in terms of theology or to reform the Church; and yet it looks for its sense and justification in the sphere of ethical values.

Perhaps the most important difference lies somewhere else. It comes from the attitude of both movements to revolution. Liberation Theology, at least as presented by its prominent exponents, looks forward to revolution as a fulfilment of hopes cherished by the oppressed. The Solidarity Movement has already gone through revolution as a historical event which has brought more problems to be solved than solutions. The social order emerging from the revolution led to an unheard-of labour crisis. Social misery, apparently got rid of, came home to roost. What can be done to dispose of it? One thing is certain: revolution is no longer taken into account. Therefore, each movement has a different approach to ethics: while one group want to devise a way to transform ethics so that the door to revolution is open, the other one ask how to graft ethics onto the post-revolutionary world.

We are comparing here Liberation Theology with the Solidarity Movement. What is the purpose of this comparison? It is not a critique, though some critical remarks are going to be made. The purpose is a better mutual understanding. Both movements can be enriched by the undoubted achievements of each. Liberation Theology may help the Solidarity Movement define its relation to religion and its richness, and the Solidarity Movement can provide a great deal of food for thought as far as the relationship between the Liberation Movement and Marxism or socialism goes. It is all the more possible as both movements remain close to the Church, which can provide the desired common plane.

The roots of rebellion

The roots of the Liberation Movement and the Solidarity Movement seem to be similar: they originate from the experience of pain suffered by victims of social injustice. Liberation Theology defines them [victims] using the word “poor”. The “poor” are the reason for the moral movement of liberation and its theology. If there were no “poor”, neither the movement nor its theology would exist. The “poor” give meaning to and legitimize the whole of liberating actions. At the same time, Liberation Theology makes a great effort to endow the word “poor” with a religious, theological meaning. The “poor” are to become a kind of absolute value for the Liberation Movement. For this reason it is necessary to form a link between the concept of “poor” and its counterpart in the Bible. Yet, at the same time it is essential to bring out its political meaning. Therefore, it has to be admitted, though only tacitly, that the “poor” are the legitimizing reason of revolution. The “poor” of Liberation Theology must be the same “poor” (“cursed people of the earth”) who appeared and took on meaning during the Great Revolution. In such a way Liberation Theology makes the concept of “poor” a meeting point of theological, ethical and revolutionary thinking.

Let us consider with greater attention some statements coming from exponents of Liberation Theology. Gustavo Gutiérrez writes: “A ‘poor’ person is now someone oppressed, pushed to the margin, a member of the proletariat fighting for his fundamental rights, it is an exploited and oppressed social class, a country fighting for its liberation.” Referring to biblical passages, the author differentiates between spiritual poverty (“the poor in spirit”) and material poverty. The former means a soul’s opening to God and is a Christian virtue. The latter is a wrong crying out to heaven. And it is the latter poverty that the movement fights against. But there is yet another meaning of poverty: it consists in “solidarity with the poor and a rejection of poverty” as it signifies “taking on oneself the sinful condition of man to liberate him from sin and all its consequences.” That third situation can be called a poverty “through compassion.” We might guess that the poor in this sense are the proponents of Liberation Theology themselves, who do not usually come from the oppressed but share their tragic lot by choice.

The poor are the axiological absolute of Liberation Theology. They are its highest and unquestionable value. And in some sense it has to be so if revolution is to begin in the name of the poor. A revolutionary risks death. One can risk death only where a value greater than life is at stake. That is why, according to Gutiérrez, the poor assume also the meaning of a religious absolute, become such a value as Christ. J. Hanesse believes that for Gutiérrez “Jesus Christ is God who became poor in the same sense as the Word became flesh.” To die defending the poor means to die for Christ.

Ascribing an absolute value to the meaning of ‘poor’ is nothing new to revolutionary thinking. Liberation Theology only repeats the tendency already present in the ideology of the French Revolution. The analogy is so striking that it calls for closer attention. Let us refer to Hannah Arendt’s studies.

We read there: “Poverty is more than [and different from ordinary] deprivation, it is a state of constant want and acute misery whose ignominy consists in its dehumanizing force; poverty is abject because it puts men under the absolute dictates of their bodies [pure corporality], that is, under the absolute dictate of necessity as all men [, the rich and the poor,] know it from their most intimate experience and outside all speculations. It was under the rule of this necessity that the multitude rushed to the assistance of the French Revolution, for this was the multitude of the poor [who incited it and pushed it on until the revolution was buried under the very rule of need]. When they appeared on the scene of politics, [corporeal] necessity appeared with them, [the old regime was shaken,] and the new republic was stillborn; freedom had to be surrendered to necessity, to the urgency of life process itself.”[1]

Liberation Theology strives to repeat the same conceptual operation. Ascribing an absolute value to the idea of “poor” makes the necessity that the poor are subject to a political force. And Liberation Theology has an absolute moral right to do so. Yet, a question arises: won’t the needs of the “poor” turn against freedom? Won’t the call for bread stifle the call for freedom? Won’t the success of the “poor” in a revolution entail its failure?

[1] Hannah Arendt, On Revolution, the Viking Press, New York 1963, p. 54. In the square brackets there are elements of Tischner’s rendering Arendt’s thought into Polish which are not found in the original.